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Welfare Implications of the Wool  Act
Glen D. Whipple and Dale J. Menkhaus
A model of the U.S. sheep  industry is estimated and simulated to determine the
impact of the wool incentive program on actors in U.S.  sheep product  markets. The
simulation analysis  indicates that U.S. sheep  producers and lamb and wool consumers
are the program's gainers  while lamb and wool exporters and taxpayers are its losers.
Net societal losses averaged $26.4  million per year during the  1980-85 period,
considering U.S.  as well as exporter  interests. This loss is about 2.5% of average U.S.
consumer expenditures  on lamb and wool over the period.
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The National Wool Act of 1954 established a
program of direct payments to support the in-
comes of wool producers. The rationale for the
support  of wool  rested  on  the  premise  that
wool is "an essential and  strategic commodi-
ty" which  is not produced  in sufficient  quan-
tities  in the United  States  to  meet domestic
needs.  Despite the  wool  incentive  payments,
wool production has continued to decline, from
283  million  pounds  in  1955  to  84  million
pounds in 1986 (Government Accounting Of-
fice; American Sheep Producers'  Council).
It has been  argued that the incentive  pro-
gram has had little impact on wool production.
In a 1982 study, Gardner used an econometric
formulation to estimate the effects of the Wool
Act. Gardner estimated that the incentive pro-
gram increased wool production  from 7-15%
in  1980. This study concluded that maintain-
ing  wool  production  at  1950s  levels  was  an
impossible task due to the small percentage of
revenue  sheep  producers  receive  from  wool.
Although a sound study, Gardner's model did
not include  adjustments  in the  lamb  market
in response to falling wool production.
It is the purpose of this article to present a
theoretical framework for evaluating the effect
of policy in the joint product case of lamb and
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wool and to empirically  measure the impacts
of the Wool Act on lamb and wool producers
and consumers.  To this end, consistent theo-
retical and empirical models  are developed to
model sheep producer and lamb and wool con-
sumer response to the Wool Act. The empirical
model is simulated and simulation results are
compared  to measure  the effects of the Wool
Act on wool market participants.
Economics  of Wool  and Lamb Markets
Wool and lamb are the joint products of sheep
production and for the most part are comple-
mentary outputs. Any policy instrument which
affects the price or production level of an out-
put will impact its joint product.  As a result,
the wool incentive program impacts  not only
wool markets,  but lamb markets as well.
Economic Model Illustrated
Domestic farm and retail markets for wool and
lamb are illustrated in figure 1. The horizontal
axis in figure 1  represents the quantity of sheep
and associated outputs of wool (sheep  x wool/
sheep) and lamb (sheep  x  lamb/sheep).  Price
or revenue  per sheep  from lamb  and wool is
located on the vertical  axis. Thus, price in fig-
ure 1 is defined as output-per-sheep  times the
price of the product considered. Interpretation
is the same as the more traditional price/quan-
tity graph,  assuming  output-per-sheep  is  un-
affected by prices in the short run. Since price
and quantity  are adjusted for lamb and wool
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QUANTITY  OF  SHEEP,  LAMB  and  WOOL
Figure 1.  A graphic illustration of the U.S.  market for  sheep products including  the welfare
effects  of the Wool  Act
output-per-sheep,  the same adjustment is im-
plied for the supply or demand schedules rep-
resented in figure 1. This approach is necessary
due  to the jointness  in lamb  and  wool  pro-
duction.
U.S.  demands  for  wool  at  the  farm  and
wholesale levels are labeled D WF and D  WW,
respectively. The wholesale and retail level de-
mands for lamb are  labeled DLW and DLR,
respectively.  These demands  may be satisfied
with domestically produced  and/or imported
products. The supply of wool imports (SWm)
is on a raw or farm level basis. Lamb imports
supply, labeled SLm,  is on a wholesale or car-
cass basis. The demand for domestically  pro-
duced wool, labeled ED  WF in figure  1, is de-
fined  as  the  excess  of demand  (DWF) over
import supply (SWm) at various prices. Thus,
at  a  price  P*,  EDWF(P*)  =  DWF(P*)  -
SWm(P*). As illustrated in figure 1, excess de-
mand is zero at the intersection  of D WF and
SWm and positive at prices  below that inter-
section. Similarly, the wholesale level demand
for  domestically  produced  lamb  (EDLW) is
the excess of demand (DL W) over import sup-
ply  (SLm) at various  prices.  The demand for
domestic  lamb  at  the  farm  level  (EDLF) is
derived from the wholesale demand (EDL  W).
The  domestic  supply  schedule  for  sheep
products,  labeled SSF, relates breeding sheep
numbers to annual revenue from the lamb and
wool output of the sheep. Due to the jointness
in production, lamb and wool are produced in
fixed proportions. Thus, lamb and wool prices
work jointly to determine breeding sheep pop-
ulation and related lamb and wool output. The
demand  for domestic sheep products, labeled
DSF, is the vertical sum of the farm level do-
mestic  demands  for lamb (EDLF) and wool
(EDWF). It relates  the quantity  of breeding
animals  and related outputs to consumer ex-
penditures for the outputs of a sheep.
Without a wool program, equilibrium in the
domestic  sheep products  market is at the in-
tersection of SSF and DSF with QS breeding
animals in the flock. Revenue and expenditure
1
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Table 1.  Summary of Welfare  Transfers and Losses  Associated with the Wool  Incentive Pro-
gram
Figure  1 Welfare  Area Description
Wool Consumers
PWW q s PWW  Domestic wool consumers'  surplus gain
q r s  Deadweight  loss of economic surplus
Lamb Consumers
PLR u v PLR'  Domestic lamb consumers'  surplus gain
u t v  Deadweight  loss of economic surplus
Lamb and Wool Producers
PWLF' cc z PWLF  Domestic lamb and wool producers'  surplus gain
PLF a b PLF'  Loss of revenue due to lower lamb prices/available  to lamb consumers
PWF' efPWR'  Incentive payment transfer from the government  to domestic wool producers
PWR gfPWR'  Loss of revenue due to lower wool prices/available  to wool consumers
cc y z  Deadweight loss of resources
Foreign  Lamb and Wool Producers
PLW h k PLW'  Foreign lamb producers'  surplus loss
PLWj k PLW'  Loss of surplus available to U.S. lamb consumers
j  h k  Deadweight  loss of economic  surplus
PWR o p PWR'  Foreign wool producers'  surplus loss
PWR n p PWR'  Loss of surplus available to U.S. wool consumers
n o p  Deadweight  loss of economic surplus
per sheep from lamb and wool sales is PWLF.
A breeding flock of QS yields lamb and wool
outputs of QL and Q W, respectively.  The raw
wool price, PWR, is determined  at the inter-
section of QWand ED  WF. At PWR, QCWis
consumed.  This consumption  is made  up  of
QWm  wool imports  and  QW domestic  pro-
duction.  The  wholesale  wool  price  is  PWW
(from  the  intersection  of QCW and DWW).
Without the wool program, producers receive
the market raw wool price for their wool.
Equilibrium in the domestic lamb market is
at the intersection of QL and EDLF  with lamb
market  price  of PLF. A  farm  price  of PLF
corresponds  to a carcass price of PLW (from
the intersection of QL and EDL W). At PL  W,
consumption  of QCL is made up of QLm im-
ports (from the intersection of  PL  Wand SLm)
and QL domestic production.  The retail price
is  PLR (from  the  intersection  of  QCL and
DLR). Note that lamb and wool are produced
in fixed proportions  (QS,  QW, and QL are at
the same output point in figure  1) while lamb
and wool  can be imported  and consumed  in
any proportion.
Economic Impact of the Wool Program
Illustrated
Welfare transfers and losses resulting from the
Wool Act are summarized in table  1.
Under the Wool Act, wool production is en-
couraged  by  a  subsidy  paid  directly  to  pro-
ducers.  On average  this subsidy is the differ-
ence between the wool incentive price (a parity-
based target price) and the wool's value in the
market.  In  figure  1 the incentive  price  is  la-
beled IPW.
The incentive  payment  subsidy  acts  to in-
sure domestic producers at least the incentive
price  for their wool.  Thus,  in  effect,  the de-
mand  for the wool  of domestic producers  is
perfectly  elastic at IPW for all  quantities be-
yond the intersection of IPWand  ED  WF. This
in turn lends a kink to the demand for domestic
sheep  production  (DSF'). Incentive  program
equilibrium  in  the  domestic  sheep  products
market is at the intersection of DSF' and SSF,
with a breeding flock of QS' and resulting wool
and  lamb  outputs  of QW' and  QL', respec-
tively. Revenue per sheep from lamb and wool
sales  is  PWLF'. With  QW'  production,  the
domestic  wool  market  clears  at  price  PWR'
(intersection  of  QW'  and  EDWF).  Foreign
producers  supply  QWm'  at  PWR'.  A  lower
wool price  reduces foreign  producers'  surplus
by area PWR op PWR'. Area PWR n p PWR'
is  available  to  U.S.  wool  consumers  due  to
lower wool  prices.  However,  area  n o p is a
deadweight loss of producers'  surplus. Lower
raw (PWR') and corresponding  wholesale
(PWW') wool prices cause wool consumption
to increase to QCW'. Due to a lower price and
increased  consumption,  consumers  capture
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additional  surplus  of PWW q s PWW'. Area
PWW m I PWW' is available  from  wool ex-
porters, and area m r s I (equivalent of PWW
c d PWW') accrues  from lost wool sales  rev-
enue of domestic  wool producers.'  Total pro-
ducers' losses available to wool consumers ex-
ceed consumers'  surplus captured  by area q r
s, an area of deadweight  loss.
Domestic  lamb  and  wool  producers'  wool
revenue is increased due to the incentive pro-
grams by area PWF  'egPWF.  Wool producers
receive  an  incentive  payment  from  the gov-
ernment of area PWF'  efPWR', but a part of
this, area PWR gfPWR'  is lost due to lower
wool prices.  In effect,  area PWR gfPWR'is
an  indirect  transfer  to  domestic  wool  con-
sumers.
With the incentive program, equilibrium  in
the domestic lamb market is at the intersection
of QL'and EDLF  with a farm level lamb price
ofPLF'.  At corresponding wholesale and retail
prices  of PLW' and PLR', QLm'  is imported
and  QCL' is  consumed.  A  lower  farm  level
lamb  price  implies  a  loss of revenue  to  do-
mestic lamb producers of PLF  a b PLF'. This
loss  is  available  to lamb  consumers  through
lower prices.  A lower wholesale lamb price re-
duces imports to QLm' and foreign lamb pro-
ducers'  surplus  by  area  PLW h  k PLW'. A
portion  of this  loss  is available  to domestic
lamb consumers (area PL Wj k PL W) but area
j  h k is a deadweight loss.  Due to lower lamb
prices,  lamb  consumers'  surplus  is increased
by area PLR u v PLR'. However, the surplus
losses of domestic and foreign lamb producers
available to lamb consumers, PLR aa  bb PLR'
and aa t v bb, respectively (assuming a constant
market margin, these equal PLF a b PLF'  and
PL Wj k PL  W'  respectively),  exceed the sur-
plus captured  by lamb  consumers by area u t
v, an area of deadweight loss.
Domestic  lamb  and  wool  producers'  wool
revenue  is increased by government  transfers
under the incentive program but lamb revenue
is reduced.  The net transfer is represented by
area PWLF'  cc y PWLF in figure  1. However,
producers  are able to capture  additional  sur-
plus  of only area PWLF' cc z PWLF. Thus,
area cc y z is a deadweight loss.
Areas PWW c d PWW' and PWW m  I PWW' are equivalent
to areas PWR gfPWR 'and PWR np PWR',  respectively, assuming
that the wool marketing margin is constant.
The Simulation Model
An econometric model of the U.S. sheep pro-
ducers' sector was developed to investigate the
impacts  of the  wool  incentive  program.  The
model  consists  of four segments:  a domestic
sheep  products  supply segment,  a lamb  and
wool import supply segment,2 a wool demand
segment,  and  a  lamb  demand  segment.  The
model  equations  are listed in  appendix  1. A
diagram characterizing the relationships among
simulation  model  equations  and  the  corre-
spondence  between  simulation  model  equa-
tions and the graphic model (figure 1) is shown
in figure  2.  Endogenous  relationships  within
the simulation model are emphasized in figure
2. Market quantities and prices are the endog-
enous  factors  driving  the  simulation  model.
Equations characterized  in figure  2  are num-
bered to correspond to simulation model equa-
tions listed  in appendix  1. The  labels  in pa-
rentheses relate simulation model equations to
the graphic  model depicted in figure  1.
The  domestic  supply  segment  is  modeled
using a series of eight equations,  four behav-
ioral and four identities. (All behavioral equa-
tions are  characterized  in bold  type.)  In  the
aggregate case,  historic retention of lambs for
breeding purposes [equation (1)]  along with the
stock sheep slaughter decisions determine the
size of the breeding flock [equation (2) labeled
SSF in figure  1].  The breeding flock provides
two valuable outputs, lamb and,wool. Lambs
may be  slaughtered  for  meat  or retained  to
enter the breeding  flock during the next pro-
duction period.  Lamb slaughter  [equation (7)]
with live lamb weight [behavioral equation (3)]
determines domestic lamb  production  [equa-
tion  (8)  or  QL in  figure  1].  Domestic  lamb
production and lamb imports  [equation (9)  or
QLm in figure  1]  combine for total lamb sup-
ply. Lamb  market  equilibrium  is insured  by
equation (14) where supply is set equal to de-
mand (as shown in figure 2, this is equivalent
to  setting  QL equal  to  EDLW in  figure  1).
Consumption per capita determines retail lamb
price [equation (11) and PLR in figure  1] which
in turn determines wholesale lamb price [equa-
tion (12) or PL Win figure  1].  Wholesale lamb
price in turn determines the farm price of lamb
2 Live  sheep imports  and  exports  as well  as  lamb  and wool
exports historically  have been negligible.  Thus, they are ignored
in this analysis.
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tive  Program  (18)
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tive  Program  (20)
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Figure 2.  Illustration of the correspondence  between the simulation and graphic models
(PLF) [equation  (13)  and PLF in  figure  1].
Wholesale lamb price is the endogenous factor
determining  lamb imports  (QLm),  while the
farm  price  of lamb  impacts  lamb weight  (3),
lamb slaughter, and breeding sheep slaughter.
The breeding flock and replacement animals
are  shorn  to  provide  the  wool  output.  The
number  of animals  shorn  multiplied  by  the
fleece  weight  [equation  (4)]  yields  domestic
wool production  (QW in figure  1).  Domestic
wool production  and wool imports  [equation
(10)  and  QLm in figure  1]  combine  for total
wool  supply.  Wool market equilibrium  is in-
sured by equation  (17)  where  wool  supply  is
set equal to wool demand and solved  for the
raw wool  price, PWR. As  shown in figure  2,
this is equivalent to setting Q Wequal to ED  WF
in figure  1. The raw wool price determines the
wholesale  price  of wool  [PWW in  equation
(15)] which in turn determines per capita wool
consumption  in  the  wool  demand  equation
(15).  Total  wool  consumption  is  simply  per
capita consumption times population  (18).
The raw wool  price  (PWR) is the  endoge-
nous factor  determining  wool imports  under
the  incentive  program.  The  raw  wool  price
equals the farm level wool price (PWF) if the
market price is above the incentive price, oth-
erwise, the farm price is equal to the incentive
price  [equation  (20)].  Without  the incentive
program, the farm price of wool is equal to the
raw wool market price. The farm price of wool
is  an  endogenous  factor  which  affects  the
slaughter  of both breeding animals  [equation
(2)] and lambs [equation  (1)].
Equations (1-19) in the "no policy" case and
(1-18) and (20) (appendix 1)  in the "Wool Act"
case constitute a farm level model of the U.S.
sheep industry with linkages to wholesale and
retail level markets.  As illustrated in figure  2,
the empirical  model  listed  in appendix  1 is
consistent with the theoretical  model graphi-
cally depicted in figure 1. Response parameters
for the endogenous  factors  in the simulation
model (appendix 1) are listed in table 2. These
show the response of domestic lamb and wool
/
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Table  2.  Estimated Elasticities and Flexibil-
ities  Associated  with Sheep  Industry Simula-
tion Model
Related to
Simulation  Related to
Model  Graphic
Equation(s)  Model
Elasticity or  (appendix  Function
Flexibility  1)  (figure 1)  Estimate
%  AQL,
% APLF,  1-8  SSF  l.70a
%  APLFt
/%  AQLt
% AWFt  1-8  SSF  0.78a
"/o%  APWF,
%  AQW,
1-8  SSF  0.92a %  APWF,
%  PLF,  1-8  SSF  1.85a
% APLF,
%  AQLm,
%  APLW,  9  SLm  1.47b % APLW,
%  aQWm,








%  ACONL  ,  11-12  DLW  -0.66bc
%  ACONLMB,
%  APLF,
% ACONLMB,  11-13  EDLF  -0.84b
%  ACONLMB,
% CWWC,  15  DWW  -0.15
b
%  APWW,
% QWWC, 15-16  DWF  -0.09"
%  APR W,
aTo estimate  supply response  parameters  for  the  supply model,
the model was dynamically  simulated  using the Newton method,
initially with  actual prices  to yield  a baseline  solution  and then
resimulated  for wool price,  lamb price,  hay price, and beef price
assuming a sustained  10%  increase in the value of the particular
price factor while all other values were set to actual values. These
increased price solutions were compared with the baseline solution
to calculate supply response elasticities. The horizon reported here
is five  years.
b Calculated at the means of the data.
cCalculated using the elasticity or flexibility of price  transmission
concepts.
supplies to lamb price to be elastic over a five-
year horizon. Both wool and lamb outputs are
less  responsive  to  wool  price.  The  dynamic
nature of the supply model allows supply elas-
ticities  to be  inelastic  in the  short  run  with
elasticity increasing as the horizon increases.
Wool  and  lamb  import supply  elasticities
are estimated to be 1.06 and 1.47, respectively,
evaluated  at  the data  means.  The  lamb  de-
mand flexibilities at the retail, wholesale,  and
farm  levels  are  estimated to  be  -. 58,  -. 66
and -. 84, respectively, evaluated at the means
of the data.  The estimated demand elasticity
for wool  is  -.15  at  the  wholesale  level  and
-. 09  at  the farm  level.  All  of the  response
parameters in the simulation model are short
run except in the case of the domestic supply
model where the dynamic nature of the model
allows the response  to vary with time.
The sheep industry model was dynamically
simulated on an annual basis using the Newton
method (Judge et al.,  pp.  650-52).  Using ob-
served  values  for independent  variables,  the
model was  simulated assuming  the incentive
payment  to be  a  part of the wool  price  and
again  assuming  no  incentive  payment  was
made.3 All  tariffs  were  assumed in place  for
both simulations.  The results of the two equi-
librium simulations  were  compared  to gauge
the effects  of the incentive  payment  program
on the sheep industry.
Results
Changes in the stock sheep numbers  and var-
ious  output  measures  resulting  from  the  in-
centive payment program are listed in table 3.
The results of the model simulations indicate
that the incentive  program  has had  a major
impact on the U.S. sheep industry.  The size of
the breeding flock (Stock Sheep) increased by
over  26% between  1955 and  1985  as a result
of the  incentive  program.  Wool  production
follows  stock  sheep  numbers  closely.  As the
model  formulation  would  suggest, lamb  pro-
duction  increases  due  to  the wool  incentive
payment; lag stock sheep and wool production
increase  because  producers  hold lambs  from
slaughter to build the breeding flock. Note that
the Wool  Act has had  a minimal impact  on
wool  consumption  (table  4).  Though  prices
were lowered,  the inelastic nature of wool de-
mand implied little consumption response. In-
creased wool production mostly was offset by
reduced  imports.  It  is  also  notable  that the
3 To  validate the simulation model, the dynamically  simulated
equilibrium, assuming  the incentive program in place, was com-
pared to observed equilibrium conditions.  The results of this com-
parison show the model to do an adequate job of simulating actual
equilibrium.  Mean  percent  simulation  error was  8.9% for  stock
sheep,  17.6% for  wool output,  4.4% for  lamb output,  -4.4%  for
farm price of lamb,  -10.4%  for lamb  consumption,  -2.8%  for
retail  lamb price,  -3.3%  for  wool consumption,  5.8%  for lamb
imports, and 6.2% for wool  imports. The most serious error was
a misestimation of lamb consumption and wool production during
certain periods.
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Table  3.  Impact of the Wool  Incentive  Pro-





Wool  Lamb  Lamb/
Pro-  Pro-  Wool  Wool
Stock  duc-  duc-  Reve-  Lamb  Im-
Year  Sheep  tion  tion  nue  Imports  ports
..  ........................................  (  )  .............  ..........................
1960  1.5  1.8  1.0  1.5  -1.2  -0.9
1965  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.9  -2.5  -1.2
1970  11.7  12.9  6.8  15.6  -3.5  -5.4
1975  10.2  9.0  11.1  1.9  -8.7  -3.8
1980  5.7  6.1  3.9  7.4  -3.7  -1.7
1985  26.3  28.8  16.7  29.9  -22.8  -5.7
Wool Act  has had  a sizable  impact  on lamb
consumption and imports through lower lamb
prices. Consumption was increased nearly 14%,
while  imports fell over 22% in  1985.
Measures of the welfare implications  of the
Wool Act  illustrated in  figure  1 are  listed in
appendix 2 for selected  years. Estimation for-
mulas  for the  welfare  effects  are  detailed  in
appendix 3. Measures of the net effects of the
Wool Act  on producers,  consumers,  market-
ers, and the government are provided in table
5.4
Sheep producers' benefits from the Wool Act
have been modest. Producers'  surplus was in-
creased  an  average  of about  $23  million per
year during the  1980s by the wool  incentive
program.  This amounts to about 4% of sheep
producers' total wool and lamb revenue.  How-
ever,  the  effects  of the  program  have  been
somewhat  erratic.  For example,  in  1960  in-
creased surplus accounted  for less than  1% of
producers'  revenue  whereas  in  1983,  it  ac-
counted  for nearly  8%  of producers'  revenue.
Both  lamb and wool  consumers have ben-
4 The sensitivity of  the simulation model welfare results to changes
in  various  key  model parameters  such  as  wool  and lamb  price
coefficients of supply and demand was tested by reducing the value
of the coefficient  in question by  1% and resimulating the model.
Results  show  the  model to be  modestly sensitive  to changes  in
supply and demand price parameters. This sensitivity can be char-
acterized by the mean  percent change in the lamb and wool con-
sumers' and producers'  surplus  effects due  to a reduction in the
wool price  supply parameters  (-2.3%  and  15.6%,  respectively);
the lamb price supply parameters (-2.4% and 2.5%, respectively);
the wool price demand parameters (-.9%  and 3.8%, respectively);
and  the  lamb  quantity  demand  parameters  (1.5%  and  -3.0%,
respectively).  Producers'  effects  are  somewhat  more sensitive  to
parameter adjustment than are consumers'  effects.
Table 4.  Impact of Wool  Incentive  Program
on Lamb and Wool  Consumption and Price
Change  In
Retail  Lamb  Wholesale  Wool
Price of  Consump-  Price of  Consump-
Year  Lamb  tion  Wool  tion
................................------..........---..------------------.....--  (O/o)  ....................................-----.............
1960  -0.6  1.0  -0.8  0.1
1965  -1.4  2.4  -1.0  0.2
1970  -3.4  6.2  -4.0  0.8
1975  -5.4  10.1  -1.8  0.6
1980  -1.6  2.9  -0.7  0.3
1985  -7.2  13.9  -3.4  1.3
efited  from  the increased  production  stimu-
lated by  the wool  incentive  payment.  Lamb
consumers'  surplus gains of $55.2 million ac-
counted for nearly 8% of consumers' lamb ex-
penditures  in  1985,  while  wool  consumers'
gains of $31.8  million totaled over 9% of con-
sumers'  wool  expenditures.  The  relatively
greater impact on wool consumers  is due pri-
marily to the more inelastic demand for wool.
Government transfers to sheep producers were
about $100 million per year over the 1983-85
period.  Note  that  the  government  costs  re-
ported in  table  5 are  simulated  rather  than
actual incentive transfers.  Simulated incentive
program costs generally are somewhat greater
than actual  costs  since  not all  producers  re-
quest an incentive payment and simulated costs
assume  a payment on all wool production.
Lamb  and  wool  exporters  lose  economic
surplus as a result of the Wool Act. Lamb ex-
porters'  surplus  losses  were  $3.2  million  in
1985,  nearly  10% of lamb exporters'  revenue.
Wool exporters'  losses were  $14.5  million  in
1985,  about 5% of wool exporters'  revenue.
The social welfare effect of the incentive pro-
gram is simply the sum of  the deadweight loss-
es  resulting  from  the program's  market  dis-
tortions. If only the U.S. interest is considered,
then transfers from lamb and wool exports ac-
crue to internal interests and offset, somewhat,
deadweight  losses.  In this case,  the net social
welfare effect of the program may be positive.
The  simulation analysis  shows the Wool Act
to cause $25.7 million in social losses in 1985
when only the U.S. interest is considered. Con-
sidering  U.S.  and  exporter  interests,  social
losses would necessarily occur during each year.
These losses were $43.4 million in 1985, about
4%  of consumers'  lamb  and  wool  expendi-
tures.
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Table 5.  Net Effects  of the Wool  Incentive  Program
Affected Group  1960  1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
U.S. Lamb and Wool  .......-------.--.......................----------------  ($ millions)  .........................................................................
Producers
a 0.05  14.1  7.7  22.4  28.8  35.6  31.2  15.2
(PWLF' cc z PWLF)  (0.01)  (3.7)  (4.8)  (6.4)  (7.9)  (6.7)  (3.2)
U.S. Wool Consumersb  8.0  26.0  5.4  6.1  9.8  15.2  22.8  31.8
(PWWqsPWW)  (1.8)  (9.7)  (1.4)  (1.6)  (3.1)  (5.0)  (6.9)  (9.2)
U.S. Lamb Consumersb  2.5  18.0  10.3  6.9  11.2  22.3  37.0  55.2
(PLR u vPLR)  (0.57)  (3.5)  (1.6)  (1.0)  (1.7)  (3.2)  (5.2)  (7.7)
U.S. Government
(IPW  efPWR')  5.5  53.7  27.8  -46.7  -66.9  -94.8  -114.6  -123.0
Wool Exportersa  -3.3  -11.2  -2.4  -2.8  -4.5  -7.0  -10.5  -14.5
(PWR op PWR)  (1.2)  (6.3)  (0.86)  (1.0)  (1.8)  (3.0)  (4.0)  (5.2)
Lamb Exportersa  -0.03  -0.95  -1.6  -0.7  -1.4  -2.3  -3.6  -3.2
(PLWhkPLW)  (0.80)  (4.9)  (2.6)  (1.6)  (2.7)  (4.8)  (7.3)  (9.7)
Net Welfare  Effects:  -2.7  -2.3  -2.5  -11.8  -17.3  -22.3  -24.4  -25.7
U.S. Interestc  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (1.1)  (1.8)  (2.3)  (2.3)  (2.4)
Net Welfare  Effects:
U.S. and Exporter  -0.63  -14.5  -6.5  -15.4  -23.2  -31.6  -38.5  -43.4
Interestsd  (0.01)  (1.9)  (0.65)  (1.5)  (2.4)  (3.2)  (3.7)  (4.1)
a The numbers in parentheses are producers'  surplus change  as a percentage  of producers'  revenue.
b The numbers  in parentheses  are consumers'  surplus change  as a percentage of consumers' expenditures.
cPWR n p PWR' +  PLWj k PLW  - cc y z  - q r s - u t v. The numbers  in parentheses  are welfare  effects as a percentage of total
consumer lamb and wool expenditures.
d -cc  y  z  q r s - u  t v - j h k - n o p. The numbers in parentheses are welfare  effects as a percentage  of total consumer lamb and
wool expenditures.
Implications
These simulation results indicate that the Wool
Act, with its incentive payment for wool,  has
had a substantial impact on the size and output
of the U.S.  sheep  industry.  Although  in  de-
cline, the industry would have declined faster
without the incentive payments.  The welfare
losses associated  with the wool program have
been  modest (average  $1,956,035  per year if
only U.S. interests are considered) over its life,
but the impacts on particular groups and dur-
ing  particular  periods  have  been  more  sub-
stantial.  Clearly,  the government, responsible
for the incentive transfer, has been the biggest
loser.  Lamb and wool  consumers'  gains  have
been substantial.  It is notable that consumers'
gains  have exceeded  sheep and lamb produc-
ers'  gains  during  most years  since  the  Wool
Act's  adoption.  Consumers'  gains  exceeded
those of  producers substantially in some years,
e.g.,  by a factor  of over  five in  1985.  Lamb
and wool  exporters  have  suffered losses  as  a
result of the incentive program, although lamb
exporters'  losses have been small.  This result
shows  that  a  large  portion  of the  incentive
transfer  is passed  through  to lamb  and wool
consumers.  In  addition,  wool  and  lamb  ex-
porters'  losses  resulting  from  lower  market
prices with the incentive program largely pass
through to consumers.
It  should  be  noted  that this  is  an ex post
analysis of the wool program.  Its results show
the effects of the wool program over the recent
past,  given the structure  and exogenous  con-
ditions of the past.  Response  parameter  esti-
mates  reflect the behavior  of market  partici-
pants  with the wool  program  in place.  Even
with  this  caveat,  the  relatively  small  social
losses  associated  with the wool  program  and
recognition of benefits captured  by lamb  and
wool consumers, as  well as the treasury costs
of the program,  would seem to be important
considerations  in future  farm  policy  deliber-
ations.
[Received May 1988; final revision
received February  1990.]
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(.00002) The Simulation Model
The econometric model of the U.S. sheep production  sec-
tor used in this research consists of a domestic sheep prod-
ucts supply segment, a lamb and wool import supply seg-
ment, and a lamb and wool demand segment. All behavioral
equations were estimated based on 1950-85 annual data.
Data were  collected from selected issues of Livestock and
Meat Statistics [U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)],
Agricultural Statistics (USDA),  Wool Statistics and Re-
lated  Data  and Supplements  (USDA), and Cotton and  Wool
Situation and Outlook Report (USDA).  Supply  and  de-
mand components of  the model were estimated separately,
using single-equation techniques. Data limitations and the
size of  the model precluded the use of a systems estimation
procedure.  Where autocorrelation  was a problem,  equa-
tions  were corrected  for  autocorrelation  using the  Yule-
Walker method  (Gallant and Goebel),  and p is reported.
In those  cases where autocorrelation  was not a problem,
least squares techniques  were used, and the Durbin-Wat-
son  statistic  is reported.  The  standard  errors  for  coeffi-
cients are listed in parentheses beneath the respective coef-
ficients.  A  more  complete  presentation  of the domestic
sheep  supply model is contained  in Whipple and Menk-
haus (1989b).  The lamb demand  segment is discussed in
Whipple  and Menkhaus  (1989a),  and  the wool  demand
segment is discussed in Hewlett, Whipple, and Menkhaus.
+ .00695AGE,+jY,)
(.0224)
R2= .993  F=  600.1  DW =  1.3,
(3)  LVWT,  = 79.386 + .18291PLF,
(.878)  (.058)
- .9703PCON, +  .5052 YEAR,
(.4103)  (.0386)







FLCWT, = 1.2675  + .8458FLCWT,_1
(.531)  (.0698)
R2 =.738  F= 61.21  DW =  2.58,
SSRN, = SS, + REPL t+,,
QW, = SSRNt  FLCWT ,
LBS, = (SSt-(1  - Dot_,)  L _%o)  - REPLt+,
QL, = LMBSt  LVWT,,
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where  REPL  is  the  number  of  replacement  lambs,
8
~  SSj  is the  number of stock  sheep  aged  one  through
j=l
eight in the breeding flock, L _%  is the lambs saved per
stock  sheep  in the  breeding  flock,  Do is the lamb  death
loss as a percentage of lambs saved, PLF  is the farm price
for lamb ($/lb.), PH  is the alfalfa hay price ($/ton), YEAR
is a linear time trend variable (1950-85), PWFis the farm
price  of wool including  incentive  payments ($/lb.), PLB
is the price  of farm labor index,  PB is the calf price ($/
lb.),  PS is the price of cull sheep  ($/lb.), AGE is the age
in years of a particular  stock sheep cohort, LVWT is the
average live lamb weight (lbs.), PCON  is the price of 20%
protein concentrate ($/ton), FLCWT is annual wool out-
put per  animal  (lbs.),  SSRN is  number  of sheep  shorn
(head), QWis total domestic wool production (lbs.), LBS
is lambs  slaughtered  (head), and  QL is lamb production
(live weight, lbs.).
Import supply.
(9)  QLm, =  -32,511,753.4  + 363,904.4PLW,
(5,570,045)  (78,935)
+ .03309NZA ULP, - 497,746.3PEXP,
(.0053)  (101,209)
R2 = .819  F=  36.2  p =.19,
(.17)















2 = .723  F=  12.61  p=.37,
(.17)
where  QLm is annual  lamb imports  for  the  U.S.  (lbs.),
PLWis the U.S. wholesale carcass lamb price ($/lb.), PEXP
is the average price of New Zealand and Australian lamb
exports weighted by share of U.S. lamb imports by origin
($/lb.), NZA ULP is lamb production in New Zealand and
Australia  (lbs.),  QWm is total wool  imports  (clean  lbs.),
PWR is the  U.S.  raw wool  price  ($/lb.),  PWWD is the
world market price of raw wool (U.S. $/clean lb.), QAEXP
is Australian wool exports (mill. greasy kg), TRSUS is the
U.S. tariff on raw imported wool ($/clean lb.), and WD is
a binary variable for war (WD =  1 if YEAR  = 1951-52;
WD = 0 otherwise).
Demand  for lamb.
(11)  PLR, = exp(2.201  -. 5780 ln(CONLMB,)
(.470)  (.085)
+ .3011  ln(PBR,) + .1113 ln(INC,)
(.096)  (.062)
+ .0771  ln(PCR,) + .0645 ln(PPR,))
(.064)  (.091)
R
2 = .995  F=  2,122.7  p = -.35,
(.17)
(12)  PLW, = exp(-9.2098 + .69611n(PLR,)
(1.839)  (.098)




=  .998  F= 2,189.0  p =  .45,
(.16)
(13)  PLF, = exp(-1.608  -.1933 ln(MPW,)
(.435)  (.032)
+  1.2677 ln(PLW,) - .0054 ln(LBS,))
(.047)  (.019)
R
2 = .996  F=  2,739.0  p  =  .24,
(.17)
where PLR is the retail  price of lamb ($/lb.),  CONLMB
is annual per capita  consumption  of lamb (lbs.), PBR is
the  retail price  of beef ($/lb.),  INC is annual per  capita
personal  income in  the  U.S., PCR is  the retail  price  of
broilers ($/lb.), PPR is the retail price of pork ($/lb.),  exp
is the exponential  operator, In is the natural log operator,
R Wis the per-hour wage rate in food retailing ($/hr.), and
MPW is the per-hour wage rate in meat packing ($/hr.).
Lamb  market equilibrium. Equilibrium  in  the  lamb
market is insured by equation (14)  which links the lamb
demand system to domestic and imported lamb supplies:
(14)  CONLMB, = (.845((QLt,.5) + QLm,))/POP,,
where POP  is the U.S.  population,  the .5 constant is the
live-lamb dressing percentage, and .845  is the carcass-to-
retail yield (Livestock and  Meat Statistics).
Demandfor wool.
(15)  CQWWL =  3.6556 +  .0001769INC,
(.2915)  (.0000608)
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R2= .932  F= 106.2  p= .55,
(.15)
(16)  PWW, =  90.340  + 2.514
(40.013)  (.243)
+ .3127PTL, - .0456 YEAR,
(.103)  (.020)
+  .000000002175RA WWL
(.000000001215)
R2= .923  F=  92.9  p =  .53,
(.15)
where CQWWL is annual U.S. per capita wool consump-
tion (lbs.), PWW is the wholesale  wool price ($/lb.), PTL
is the price oftextile labor in the U.S. ($/hr.), and RA WWL
is U.S. wool production plus raw wool imports (lbs./clean
basis).
Wool market equilibrium. The total U.S.  consumption
of wool (QCW), can be defined as per capita consumption
times population (CQWWL-POP). Setting the total U.S.
demand for wool equal to domestic production (adjusted
for clean yield:  CQW, = QW,- WLYLD,,  where  WLYLD
is clean  yield  of raw  wool)  plus  wool  imports  (QWm),
substituting equation (16)  for PWW in equation  (15) and
solving  for  PWR yields  an  equilibrium  equation  which
insures a wool market price where total wool consumption
(QCW)  equals  wool  production  (CQW)  plus  imports
(QWm):
(17)  PWR,
= [((POP,(3.6556 + .0001769INC, - .11241
*(90.340 + .3127PTL, - .0456YEAR,
+ .000000002175RA WWL,)
- .05413YEAR,  + .3586WDt))
- (QWm, + CQW,))/(.11241-2.514-POPt)].
Defining total wool consumption as in equation (18) and
reconciling  the  farm  and  wool  market  raw  wool  prices
completes the simulation  system.
In the  case  of no  incentive  payment,  the  farm  price
equals the market price and equation (19)  completes the
model:
(18)  QCW, = CQW, + QWm, = CQWWLtPOPt,
and
(19) PWFt = PWR,.
In the incentive  program  case,  equation (20)  completes
the model:
(20) if PWR, > IPW, then PWF, = PWR,;
otherwise,  PWF, = IPW,,
where IPW, is the wool incentive price for period  t. Equa-
tion (20) insures that wool producers receive IPWfor their
wool without directly impacting the U.S. raw wool market.
Appendix  2.  Estimated  Welfare  Transfers and  Losses  Associated  with the  Wool  Incentive
Program: Selected  Years
Figure  1 Welfare Area  1960  1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
W  ool Consumers  ----------------------------------------  ($ millions) ---------------------.---------------------------
PWW q s PWW'  80.0  26.0  5.4  6.1  9.8  15.2  22.9  31.8
qrs  0.00  0.10  0.09  0.01  0.02  0.06  0.12  0.20
Lamb Consumers
PLR uv PLR'  2.6  18.0  10.3  6.9  11.2  22.3  37.0  55.2
u t v  0.01  0.54  0.01  0.06  0.16  0.62  1.64  3.58
Lamb and Wool Producers
PWLF' cc z PWLF  0.05  14.2  17.7  22.4  28.8  35.6  31.2  15.2
PLF  a b PLF'  2.7  19.3  12.9  8.1  113.7  26.2  43.6  64.2
PWF'efPWR'  5.5  53.7  27.8  46.7  66.9  94.9  114.6  123.0
PWR gfPWR'  2.2  6.7  0.91  1.0  1.5  2.3  3.6  4.9
cc yz  9.06  13.5  6.3  15.3  22.9  30.7  36.3  38.8
Foreign Lamb and Wool Producers
PLWh kPLW'  0.3  0.96  1.6  0.7  1.4  2.3  3.6  3.2
PLWj k PLW'  0.03  0.94  1.5  0.7  1.4  2.2  3.4  2.8
j h k  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.09  0.23  0.04
PWR op PWR'  3.3  11.2  2.4  2.8  4.5  7.0  10.5  14.5
PWR n p PWR'  3.3  10.9  2.4  2.8  4.5  6.9  10.2  14.0
n o p  0.02  0.32  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.13  0.26  0.42
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Appendix  3.  Estimation Method for the Welfare  Effects  Associated  with the  Wool  Incentive
Program
Figure  1 Welfare Area Estimating Equation
Wool Consumersa
PWW q s PWW  =  (PWW - PWW)-(QCW + ((QCW - QCW)/2))
q r s  =  (((PWW - PWW')(QCW  - QCW))/2)
Lamb Consumersa
PLR u v PLR'  =  (PLR - PLR').(QCL + ((QCL' - QCL)/2))
u t v  =  (PLR - PLR').((QCL' - QCL)/2)
Lamb and Wool Producersa  8  8  8
PWLF'cc z PWLF  =  (((PWFQW + PLF  -QL')/1  SS') - ((PWF QW + PLF QL)/1  SS,)).(  SSj
j=l  j=l  j=l
8  8
+ ((2  Ss  - SS,)/2))
j-=  j=l
PLF a b PLF'  =  ((PLF - PLF') QL')
PWF' efPWR'  =  ((PWF' - PWR') QW)
PWR gfPWR'  =  ((PWR - PWR').QW)  8  8  8
cc y z  =  (((PWF' QW'  + PLF' QL')/  SSj')  - ((PWF QW + PLF QL)/1  SS,))((  Sj'
j=l  j=1  j-=
- SS,)/2)
j=l
Foreign  Lamb and Wool Producersa
PLW h k PLW  =  (PL  W - PL  W)  (QLm' + ((QLm - QLm')/2))
PLWj k PLW  =  (PLW - PLW') (QLm')
j  h k  =  (PLW - PL  W)  ((QLm - QLm')/2)
PWR o p PWR'  =  (PWR - PWR').(QWm' + ((QWm - QWm')/2))
PWR n p PWR'  =  (PWR - PWR').(QWm')
n op  =  (PWR - PWR').((QWm - QWm')/2)
a Under the wool  incentive program  equilibrium,  variables are identified with a prime (').
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